The Doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem- An Overview with some Case Laws

Principles of natural justice form the bedrock and desideratum of our legal system. As per the principle of Audi Alteram Partem, nobody can be condemned without being given a fair chance to be heard. The right to a fair hearing is an indispensable component of a fair trial and the foundation of a legal system based on the principles of natural justice. In the following, we would discuss the norms and components of a fair hearing.

Over the course of decades, through their successive judgments, Courts have elaborated and developed the principle of Audi Alteram Partem to construe a whole code of procedural norms or ‘administrative due process’. This concept comprises many norms, most of which are fluid and elastic. Being an abstract principle, rather than a specific law, Audi Alteram Partem could mean different things depending on the context. As a result, the concept defies a strict definition. Not only do the norms of fair hearing vary from body to body but also vary from situation to situation before the same body. While the Civil Procedure Code dictates the rules of procedure for Civil Courts and the Criminal Procedure Code lays down rules of procedure for Criminal Courts, no such code has been compiled to lay down the norms of the principles of natural justice. Being an abstract body of ideas Audi Alteram Partem is ill-suited to be confined within the rigid boundaries of a legally enforceable code. Courts have tended to look upon it more as a guiding principle to ensure fair play in a trial.

In Rattan Lal Sharma v Managing Committee (1993) it was observed by the Supreme Court that natural justice is not a fixed but a flexible concept. There exists no invariable standard of fair hearing and hence the extent and form of its applicability can be decided only on a case-to-case basis.

In Lloyds and others v Mcmahon (1987), it was said that the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. The Supreme Court has emphasized time and again that principles of natural justice are not ‘embodied rules, and therefore it is neither practical nor advisable to define strict parameters of natural justice.

In Union of India v J N Sinha (1971) the Supreme Court observed that the aim of these rules is to prevent the miscarriage of justice; however, there is no universal parameter for reasonableness in the matter of the hearing. Whether in a particular case the principles of natural justice have been contravened or not is ultimately for the Courts to decide; each case ought to be decided on its own merit.

In the same spirit, in Mineral Development Limited v State of Bihar (1960), the Supreme Court observed, ‘the concept of fair hearing being an elastic one is not susceptible to easy and precise definition’. And again in Fedco v Bilgrami (1960) the court observed that there can be no invariable standard for reasonableness in such matters except that the Court’s conscience must be satisfied that the person against whom an action is proposed has had a fair chance of convincing the authority who proposes to take action against him and that the ground on which the action is proposed are either non-existent or even if they exist, they do not justify the proposed action.

In the much-celebrated Maneka Gandhi case it was said, ‘The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rules of justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case.”

Commenting over the applicability of principles of natural justice in the context of preventive detention, the Supreme Court emphasized in A K Roy v Union of India, 1982 that the rules of natural justice are ‘not rigid norms of an unchanging context.’ The ambit of these rules may vary according to the context and, ‘they have to be tailored to suit the nature of the proceedings in relation to which the particular right is claimed as a component of natural justice.”

The doctrine of fair hearing before a tribunal does not entail that proceedings should be equally stringent and formal as in a Court. In general, it is not considered advisable that adjudicatory bodies should follow all principles of a formal court trial. In most cases, adjudicatory functions are fulfilled by administrators due to their expertise. Such bodies are set up to speed up adjudication. Tying them down with elaborate procedures and rules runs the danger of defeating the very purpose for which they are set up. Therefore, Courts have tried to find a golden mean between the requirements of operational flexibility and the judicial obligation to uphold the due process of the law. Adjudicatory bodies are allowed a good deal of leverage in devising their formal procedures, provided they do not deny any party a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

In Liberty Oil Mills v Union of India (1984) referring to clauses 8 and 10 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, the Supreme Court said that it is not necessary for the concerned authority (Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports) to follow any rigid, hide-bound, or pre-determined procedure.” It said further, that depending on the facts, circumstances, and exigencies of individual cases an authority may tailor its own procedure, which may be different in each instance. In some categories of cases, like dismissal from service, courts have tended to insist upon more rigorous procedures. Likewise in cases such as a domestic enquiry by an employer against his employees in labour matters, the Supreme Court has imposed strict procedural requirements, which it does not insist upon in most matters. In general, it has been seen that the mode of functioning of Tribunals tends to be more court-like than departmental adjudicatory bodies.

Many a time it may so happen that the statute which created an Adjudicatory body would itself lay down a procedure. If this procedure is found to be self-sufficient and adequate by the court, then the principles of natural justice do not apply. As the Supreme Court laid down in Subhash Oil Industries v State of UP, 1975, “Courts feel inclined to apply the rules of natural justice mostly in those areas not covered by any law validly made.”

Courts rarely tinker with existing laws. However, if a statutory procedure is found to be deficient, the Court may supplement it with rules informed by the principles of natural justice. Though, if the statute in question specifically excludes some aspects of natural justice, the Court cannot ignore the legislative mandate and insist on supplementing it with its own rules. Elaborating on this the Supreme Court said in the Institute of Chartered Accountants v L K Ratna, 1987, “The principles of natural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary”. The primary justification for Courts reading principles of natural justice within statutes is that no statute can lay down each procedural detail necessary to ensure a fair trial.

Application of audi alteram partem entails such procedural requirements as reasonable notice, opportunity to present a case, adequate opportunity to avail legal counsel, etc. These various components are not meant to constitute a checklist to be rigidly followed in every case. But their general tenor must reflect in the process of adjudication.

Courts’ adoption of a case-to-case approach has created some difficulties too- there appears to be a lot of confusion in this area due to inconsistent and overlapping judgments. As a result, it is difficult to stick to any general proposition of law in this field.

A wide variety of adjudicatory bodies function in the country. This makes a flexible approach to the application of the principles of natural justice indispensable. However, in the absence of regulatory superintendence, the concept of natural justice may become an empty formality. The newly emerging concept of ‘fair play’ has not helped bring about any clarity as it is not clear whether ‘fair play’ is equal to, or less than natural justice.

Here it is pertinent to emphasize that no substantive consequences flow from the concept of natural rights. It is not a clearly laid out set of rules, based on which the quality or validity of a pronounced may be judged. The concept of natural rights is best understood as a sort of legal morality that the judiciary is obligated to uphold.

Syndicate Bank v General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association, (2000) laid down primary elements of a fair hearing-

No man shall be the judge in his own cause.

No man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally, without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him.

A party must have due notice of judicial proceedings against him.

No tribunal may act on irrelevant evidence or shut out relevant evidence.

If a tribunal consists of several members, they all must always sit together.

The tribunal must act independently and must not be biased in favour of any party.

Its actions should be based on good faith and order, and it should act in a just, fair and reasonable manner.

All the above elements of fair hearing are in fact extensions of the principles of natural justice translated in the form of actionable norms.

Basudev Tiwary v Sido Kanhu University, (1998) pronounced in no uncertain terms that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of article 14 of the constitution. Its effect pervades and governs all facets of the state’s activity. It further stated that audi alteram partem aspect of natural justice is also a requirement dictated by article 14 of the constitution, for natural justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. All government actions must pass the crucible of fairness, justness and reasonableness.